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Abstract: Discursive liberal democracy might not be the best of all 
possible forms of government, yet in Europe it is largely accepted as 
such. The attractors of liberal democracy (majority rule, political 
equality, reasonable self-determination and an ideological framework 
built in a tentative manner) as well as an adequate dose of 
secularization (according to the doctrine of religious restraint) provide 
both secularist and educated religious people with the most 
convenient ideological framework. Unfortunately, many promoters of 
ideological secularization take too strong a stance against the 
manifestation of religiosity in the public sphere. They claim that 
people may discuss, debate or adopt (coercive) laws and regularities 
only by means of secular public reasons and secular motivation. We 
argue that these secular restraints on the ideological framework are 
unfairly biased against religion, counterproductive and unreasonable. 
The exaggerated secular restrictions create a strict secular public 
sphere that appears to be a Pickwickian world suitable just for 
inoffensive, dull and lethargic people. Deliberately separated from the 
idea of truth, secular public reasons cannot sustain a complex adaptive 
system like discursive liberal democracy. Liberal democracy needs 
citizens with a strong sense of truth and with a sufficient will-power to 
follow both a personal ideal and a collective ideal. Religious beliefs 
provide people with just such a sense of truth and with the desire to 
have a certain kind of character. In the secularized public sphere of 
liberal democracy, people can manifest just educated religious beliefs 
that correspond to the real world and respect the principle of 
peaceable conduct. In the final part of the article we support the 
assertion that believers could and should educate their religious belief 
before expressing them in the public sphere. Educated religious 
beliefs have a wide enough propositional content, obey the moral 
imperative of William Clifford, are purged from all propositional 
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components against which there is strong evidence and are 
consciously cultivated by the mechanism of suggestion. 
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1. The context of the issue: discursive liberal democracy 
 
The history of all hitherto existing society might not be that of class 
struggle, but it is surely the history of constant struggle between myriads of 
doctrines or ideologies. Ideological confrontations differ widely with regard 
to their durability, spread, and intensity. Some of them are intermittent 
petty squabbles that bring about fleeting changes of mood at most, but 
other ones are enduring bitter clashes that all too often lead to brutal 
repressions, savage uprisings, bloody revolutions and devastating wars.  
The European continent has been for centuries the scene of fierce 
ideological confrontations. Many of them were accompanied by bloody 
wars. The most recent and important ideological clashes led, on the one 
hand, to the marginalization of Fascism, National-Socialism and 
Communism, and on the other hand, to the affirmation of discursive liberal 
democracy as the dominant political ideology in Europe. 
At present, for almost all public voices within the Euro-Atlantic area, 
democracy is the only acceptable form of political ruling and organization of 
a society, but also a panacea for all the diseases third-world peoples suffer 
from: wars, tyranny, corruption, exploitation, poverty, discrimination, 
environmental crimes etc. (cf. Minogue 2010). The principles and values of 
liberal democracy – the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, 
the protection of human rights, equality before the law, the limitation of 
government power from interfering in the lives of people or communities, 
the majority rule in decision making, the protection of minority rights, open 
debates on public policies etc. – are invoked permanently in political life and 
seem to be commonplaces in citizens‟ conversations (cf. Farte 2010). 
Discursive liberal democracy is a self-founding political 
philosophy. It determines tentatively and in a prescriptive way its scope 
answering the following questions: (a) Who should rule? (b) How should 
rule be exercised? (c) What kind of rationale should one provide for one‟s 
political theses and actions? In general, discursive liberal democracy is 
fairly flexible so that it is possible to provide a wide range of satisfactory 
answers to above-mentioned basic questions.  
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With regard to the first question, one can say that a democratic 
society is always run by the majority of a political body that is constituted 
periodically through electoral battles between equals. Interestingly enough, 
this rough answer allows for a miscellaneous collection of specifications. 
The majority of a political body can be the better or, on the contrary, the 
worse part of society. It can also coincide with the whole political body. It 
is possible for the political body to comprise all adult male citizens who 
completed their military training, all adult men who pay taxes above a 
certain amount, all adult males, all adult persons without distinctions based 
on sex, property, race, color, religion, birth or other status, or the union of 
the living, their ancestors and their descendants.
1
 The various designs of the 
political bodies cannot mask the pillars of democracy, namely majority rule 
and political equality (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974, 29).  
The answers to question (b) substantiate the prospective liberal trait 
of democracy. The ruling part of a society governs in a liberal way only if 
“each citizen enjoys the greatest possible amount of personal liberty” 
(Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974, 29). Obviously, liberty is a relative concept. The 
greatest possible amount of personal liberty depends on historical context, 
geographical location, economic or cultural circumstances, the prevalence 
of some virtues or vices etc. Nonetheless, whatever the circumstantial 
factors of a society are, it is possible to ascertain the basic level of liberal 
governance. A society is governed liberally only if the ruling body accepts 
and follows the non-aggression principle, in other words, the principle of 
reasonable self-determination. In order to respect this principle of civilized 
life, the rulers should refrain from the proactive use of force in an 
individual‟s own sphere. The proper and inviolable sphere of someone 
includes (a) one‟s life and bodily integrity, (b) one‟s physical, psychical, 
moral and spiritual faculties and (c) the tangible and intangible goods 
which the individual has acquired by the free exercise of one‟s own 
faculties and capabilities (Farte 2015). In a highly civilized society the 
amount of personal liberty of the less fortunate could be augmented by 
means of claim rights – the right to education, the right to science and 
culture, the right to health, the right to a decent life, the right to retirement 
pension, the right to unemployment benefits etc. – provided that the 
obligations on other parties regarding the right-holders are accepted 
voluntarily. When a highly civilized society increases the amount of 
personal liberty by generally accepted claim rights, it acts in a 
supererogatory manner. 
                                                 
1
 Edmund Burke describes the state as “a divinely ordained moral essence, a spiritual 
union of the dead, the living, and those yet unborn” (cf. Kirk 2001). 
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It is evident that democracy is not eo ipso liberal. On the contrary, 
“[t]here are certain totalitarian and monolithic tendencies inherent in 
democracy. (...) The marriage between democracy and liberalism came late 
in history and had the seeds of divorce in it” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974, 34). 
It is easier to preserve democracy than the liberal way of ruling. 
The last question about the scope of discursive liberal democracy 
is of paramount importance because it requires us to determine (at the 
society level) not only the ruler and the way of running but also the frame 
of reference which the right answers might be sought in. Obviously, a 
partly self-referential question cannot be answered dogmatically but 
tentatively within a self-founding ideological framework. For example, I 
strongly believe that my above-mentioned assertions with regard to the 
question “Who should rule and how should the ruler run?” are true, but I 
know I have to consider other point of views in order to improve my 
“candidates for the truth”. 
Throughout history, all democratic societies had to cope with 
many lamentable states of affairs: blatant political inequality
2
, 
disenfranchisement of foreigners, slaves, women or the poor, unconcealed 
or disguised slavery, abortions, exploitation of children, confiscatory 
taxation, contempt of tradition
3
 etc. Depending on their frame of reference 
and prevalent discursive practices, they came to terms with these 
shortcomings or, on the contrary, got rid of them. In the absence of any 
transcendent principles, standards or means, only a framework built in a 
tentative (and precautious) manner made it possible for a society to debate 
and solve such collective problems. 
 
2. From constitutional secularization to  
ideological secularization in a liberal democracy 
 
The main attractors
4
 of discursive liberal democracy ‒ majority 
rule, political equality, the principle of reasonable self-determination, 
supererogatory extension of personal liberty, and the tentative manner of 
                                                 
2
 In a democratic society, each citizen has just one vote, but some people add many other 
political means to their vote: funds, media coverage, participation in deliberative bodies 
(town hall meetings, citizens‟ panels, citizens‟ forums, etc.), belonging to a numerous 
and politically active group, etc. Actually, it is impossible to achieve (full) political 
equality. 
3
 Our traditions synthetically express the votes of our ancestors. When we eschew our 
tradition, we nullify the votes of our forefathers. 
4 “An attractor represents the organizing principle that brings regularity to a system (i.e., 
„attracts‟ orderliness)” (Shaffer 2012, xvii). 
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building the political framework ‒ configure a complex adaptive system 
characterized by adaptativity, nonlinearity, coevolution, punctuated 
equilibrium, and self-organization
5
. The last characteristic, self-
organization, is of paramount importance because it is a necessary 
condition for the survival of discursive liberal democracy. To have and 
maintain self-organization, discursive liberal democracy “need[s] to 
operate in far-from-equilibrium conditions, where customary constraints 
loosen and random noise occurs, consisting of small but frequent 
aberrations from the expected that may become incorporated as the 
system evolves” (Murphy 2000, 454). It also requires “some form of 
internal redundancy in the form of attitudes, expectations, and behaviors” 
(Murphy 2000, 454). 
Having emerged victorious from the confrontation with other 
doctrines and ideological systems, discursive liberal democracy seems to 
be undermined by an endogenous factor that has become in the Euro-
Atlantic area both virulent and intolerant ‒ secularization. 
Generally speaking, secularization is associated with “the decline 
in the social significance of religion in modern societies” (cf. Davie 2013, 
263) and with the removal of the control or influence exercised by 
religious groups or institutions. More specifically, as George Moyser 
judiciously remarked, secularization can be examined as a [gradual and] 
complex process consisting of five branches (Moyser 1991, 14-15): 
 constitutional secularization 
 policy secularization 
 institutional secularization 
 agenda secularization 
 ideological secularization 
By constitutional secularization, the official character and purpose 
of the state cease to be defined in religious terms, and religious institutions 
cease to be given special recognition and backing. Through the process of 
policy secularization, the state ceases to regulate society on the basis of 
religious principles, values or norms, and expands its policies into formerly 
religious areas. A society is in the process of institutional secularization 
when religious organizations and institutions lose their political weight and 
influence. Agenda secularization is the process whereby political issues 
cease to have overtly religious content, and the proposed political solutions 
                                                 
5
 In the article Contingency, Complexity: Accommodating Uncertainty in Public 
Relations Theory, Priscilla Murphy provides an insightful analysis of these 
characteristics (Murphy 2000). 
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are no longer constructed on the basis of religious principles and values. 
Finally, one could recognize the progress of ideological secularization 
where the basic system of principles, values and beliefs used to evaluate the 
political realm and to give it meaning cease to be expressed through the 
language of religion (Moyser 1991, 14-15). 
The process of secularization is not proceeding everywhere at the 
same pace in all its aspects. For example, the following articles extracted 
from the Constitutions of France, Denmark and Greece respectively show 
that constitutional secularization is more advanced in France than in 
Denmark and Greece. 
 (a) “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and 
social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the 
law, without distinction of origin, race or religion” (Preamble, art. 1)6. 
 (b) The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the 
Established Church of Denmark, and) as such, it shall be supported by 
the State (Part I, art. 4)
7
. 
 (c) “The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern 
Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, 
acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united 
in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with 
every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine. (...) The text of the 
Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of the 
text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the 
Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in 
Constantinople, is prohibited” (Part I, art. 3)8. 
The degree of policy secularization correlates with the fields of 
cooperation between church and state, on the one hand, and the 
“nationalization” of vital statistics (birth, marriages, deaths etc.), health 
care services and charity, the state compulsory education of children, the 
proliferation of social welfare programs unconnected to any spiritual 
needs or the predominantly temporal character of the government‟s 
purposes, on the other hand. Taking for granted the remark made at the 
German Bishops‟ Conference about the relationship between the state and 
                                                 
6
 Constitution of 4 October 1958. Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/constitution/constitution-of-4-october-
1958.25742.html. 
7
 Denmark’s Constitution of 1953. Accessed June 17, 2015. https://www.constituteproject.org/ 
constitution/Denmark_1953.pdf. 
8
 The Constitution of Greece. Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/ 
artcl25.html#A1. 
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the church ‒ “the German view of partnership between church and state9 
differs both from the principle of mutual independence with an emphasis 
on separation (as in France and the USA) and from the model of a 
privileged church (as in Great Britain, Sweden and Greece)”10 ‒, one can 
say that in Germany the degree of policy secularization is higher than in 
UK, Sweden and Greece, but lower than in France and USA. 
Over the last decades, institutional secularization of Europe has 
advanced impressively. Some randomly selected facts speak for 
themselves. In 2009 and 2011 respectively, the percentage of religiously 
unaffiliated was estimated to be 23-28% in France, 25.7% in UK, 34.5% 
in Czech Republic, and 42% in Netherlands
11
. These percentages could be 
higher because most churches “work on a model of opting out than opting 
in” (Davie 2013, 260) so that they encompass a huge range of believers 
and unbelievers. To illustrate the point, I mention just several data. 
“Whilst 27% of the French went to Mass once a week or more in 1965, 
they are no more than 4.5% in 2009. At a doctrinal level, 63% of 
practicing Catholics think all religions are the same, 75% ask for an 
„aggiornamento‟ of the Church on contraception and even 68% for 
abortion”12. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to assert that religious 
institutions exert only a weak (or moderate at the very most) influence in 
many European societies. 
The adoption of a secular constitution based on an Enlightenment 
worldview tends to remove the supernatural purposes and reasons from 
the political agenda. Electoral platforms and governmental programs 
spotlight a general interest in the temporal welfare and seem to consign 
spiritual or supernatural wellbeing to oblivion. It is quite strange that 
politics today permeate the life of persons and communities in the same 
way as religion did in the past. The rhythm of people‟s life is no more 
                                                 
9
 “The [German] state demonstrates its respect for the social significance of the churches 
and their work towards the common good by giving them the status of corporate bodies 
under public law” (“The Church and the State,” Deutsche Bischofskonferenz. Accessed 
June 17, 2015. http://www.dbk.de/en/katholische-kirche/katholische-kirche-deutschland/ 
aufbau-ktah-kirche/kirche-staat. 
10
 “The Church and the State,” Deutsche Bischofskonferenz. Accessed June 17, 2015. 
http://www.dbk.de/en/katholische-kirche/katholische-kirche-deutschland/aufbau-ktah-
kirche/kirche-staat. 
11
 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed June 17, 2015. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html. 
12
 “Game Over for France, or will someone do something about it?”, The Anglo-
Catholic: Catholic Faith and Anglican Patrimony, January 9, 2010. Accessed June 17, 
2015. http://www.theanglocatholic.com/2010/01/game-over-for-france. 
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regulated by daily prayer, weekly liturgy, recurring religious feasts, and 
continuous meditation on eternal happiness, but by breaking news, 
newscasts, talk shows, electoral campaigns, parliamentary debates, and 
relentless striving after temporal (more exactly, material) benefits. 
Lastly, ideological secularization constitutes the cornerstone of 
the whole process of secularization and moulds the ideological systems of 
discursive liberal democracy. Ideological secularization per se causes no 
harm, but any immoderate instance of it disturbs the other branches of 
secularization and undermines the discursive foundation of liberal 
democracy.  
Such an exaggerated version of ideological secularization pertains 
to the presence of religious reasons and religious beliefs in the public 
sphere, especially if they are used to advocate or support coercive laws 
and public policies. The public voices that take a hard line on ideological 
secularization call for certain moral or legal restrictions to be applied on 
the discursive public sphere. Such restrictions range from a complete 
privatization of religious belief and the removal of the last vestiges of 
religious belief from public life to the requirement of political discussion 
to offer plausible secular rationales for each of the coercive laws 
supported thereby (cf. Eberle & Cuneo 2015). 
By adopting a deductive approach, I will argue the following 
theses: (a) some secular restrictions on ideological framework are either 
excessive or difficult to put into practice, (b) the complex adaptative 
system of liberal democracy needs central, profound, entrenched, stable, 
intense, expansive and actionable beliefs (as religious beliefs are), and (c) 
the presence of educated religious beliefs in the European public sphere is 
both legitimate and useful. 
 
3. Beliefs as objects of ideological secularization 
 
To see how justified secular restrictions on the public manifestation 
of religious beliefs are, we need to know the essentials of belief. 
First of all it is reasonable to assume that beliefs are real mental 
states (cf. Swinburne 2001, 38), like sensations, desires or intentions. 
Beliefs are distinct from physical events, although they stay causally 
connected with them, especially with certain brain events. Even if there 
are causal relations between beliefs, certain brain events, and the outside 
world, we will discuss the problem of religious belief not in terms of 
natural causation but in the language of praxeology respecting the 
following principle: “In the ordinary human relations one man is not 
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permitted to control another except by persuasion. To seek out other 
conditions of action would be an invasion of privacy. He will therefore 
explain human action in terms of belief, which is the point at which he 
may legitimately influence it” (Perry 1921, 148). Thus we are interested 
in exploring the religious beliefs ‒  as real mental states ‒ in respect of 
believers‟ privacy without looking for certain physical factors which 
could determine them causally. 
What is believed by a believer represents the propositional content 
(or the proposition) of the belief. Someone could entertain a relation of 
believing to a propositional content even though the world was different 
in a certain way. In that case the propositional content seems to be 
determined solely by the believer‟s intrinsic properties so that any 
possible intrinsic duplicate of the believer would believe the same 
content. We may call such mental states narrow content beliefs. When 
someone‟s belief depends for its existence on how the world is beyond the 
subject's mental life, we can say that the propositional content of belief 
relies in part on the subject‟s extrinsic properties. In that case there could 
be a possible intrinsic duplicate of the believer whose corresponding 
mental state lacks this propositional content. We call such mental states 
wide content beliefs (cf. Swinburne 2001, 32-33; Chalmers 2003).  
Due to their idiosyncratic characteristics, narrow content beliefs 
can be seldom seen as outdated and anachronistic. As a rule persons 
remain resolute in their narrow content beliefs whatever changes occur in 
the outside world. Most narrow content beliefs emerge predominantly in 
the moral, religious or political life of human beings. In order to keep 
their inmost moral standards, religious faith or political creed, many 
people have been ready to make sacrifices and even to suffer martyrdom. 
On the other hand, people tend to update their wide content beliefs 
depending of various transformations of the environment they have to 
cope with. Sometimes, the holders of wide content beliefs are so 
responsive to the changes in the world around them and so eager to adjust 
to their new environment that they simply abandon their beliefs. 
Evidently, many wide content beliefs belong to fashion, economic and 
cultural spheres, but the phenomenon of institutional secularization and 
the voters‟ sudden switches from one political platform to another prove a 
rapid and massive expansion of wide content beliefs in the entirety of 
human life to the detriment of narrow content beliefs. 
When people believe something, they don‟t simply consider a 
propositional content but give it their (cognitive) assent, even though 
there is no sufficient evidence for proving the truth of it. “Belief rests on 
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probability, not certainty, and yet it produces the emotional state that goes 
with certainty” (Britton 1998, 8). Let us consider, for example, the 
following propositional content: (a) Lower taxes spur investment and 
stimulate economic growth; (b) The remains discovered embedded in an 
altar of the Monastery “Sveti Ivan Island” (Bulgaria) belong to St John 
the Baptist; (c) On 11 February 1858, Bernadette Soubirous experienced 
her first vision of Virgin Mary. Despite the fact that these propositions 
could be related to very different corroborative evidence, people who 
believe them give them their assent to the same extent.  
In general, beliefs are unfalsifiable or just partially falsifiable, 
since they are based mainly on ideas that can never be proved or 
invalidated. In other words, “people can (...) resort to emphasizing 
unfalsifiable reasons for holding a belief” (O‟Grady 2014), and, therefore, 
their beliefs cannot be changed purely by facts, whether they are called 
evidence or counterevidence. As Cathleen O‟Grady justly remarked, 
unfalsifiability is an important ingredient of both religious and political 
beliefs, it allows people to hold their beliefs with more conviction, and it 
also impels people to become more polarized in those beliefs (O‟Grady 
2014). In addition to O‟Grady‟s shrewd observations, it could be 
mentioned that unfalsifiability insinuates itself into many other spheres. 
Strangely enough, in the philosophical, cultural, artistic, economic, 
journalistic or academic sphere, we have to deal more with unfalsifiable 
polarized beliefs than falsifiable knowledge. 
Beliefs are passive and involuntary mental states. Unlike 
knowledge, beliefs are generated by causes independent of our 
consciousness and will. They are not the result of a conscious and 
voluntary acquisition made by exclusively rational methods such as 
observation and experience (Le Bon 1918, 16-17). As in the case of 
resentment, forgiveness, and other feelings or attitudes, people find 
themselves in an involuntary state of believing that they cannot change in 
an instant at will (Swinburne 2001, 39). For example, it is impossible for 
a libertarian Catholic to believe overnight in the transmigration of souls or 
in the ability of a global political agency to eradicate poverty or slavery 
from the world. Any effort of will in this direction would be futile. 
Although we cannot change our beliefs at will immediately, it is 
possible to take steps to alter them over a period of time (Swinburne 
2001, 39). We are neither helpless victims nor powerful masters of our 
beliefs. People who did not strengthen their will in order to get the ability 
of self-control fall prey to morbid curiosity, unbridled passions, nameless 
fears and ... oppressive unwanted beliefs. Of course it is terrible for 
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anyone to be in such a situation, but it is more awful for one to resign 
placidly to one‟s “fate”. What is to be done? A known cause, as the 
saying goes, is a controllable cause (Perry 1921, 144). If we could 
identify the cause of a certain belief, we would have the ability to control 
the cause and to modify consciously and at will that belief. Unfortunately, 
our beliefs are causally determined by a complex and uncontrollable 
network of instincts, mental events (other beliefs, knowledge, perceptions, 
desires, intentions, etc.), brain events and physical events from the outside 
world. Nobody knows which parts of that network should be adjusted in 
order to get a desirable change of our beliefs. However, we can educate 
our web of beliefs, for example, by knowing and consciously using the 
mechanism of suggestion. By suggestion, an idea from without abruptly 
enters the consciousness, becomes a part of the stream of thought, and 
tends to produce the muscular and volitional efforts which ordinarily 
follow upon its presence (cf. Sidis 1898, 8). If we know the mechanism of 
suggestion and the general condition of normal suggestibility ‒ in an 
experimental environment: fixation of the attention on some spot, 
distraction of the attention from the objects employed for suggestion, 
monotony, limitation of the field of consciousness, inhibition, and 
immediate execution (Sidis 1898, 45-49) ‒, we can learn in a tentative 
manner (i.e., through trial and error) how to protect ourselves from 
suggestions that induce unwanted beliefs and how to expose ourselves to 
certain suggestions in order to improve our web of beliefs. 
It is an undeniable truth that all religion have used the mechanism 
of suggestion for generating and strengthen certain beliefs. By means of 
sacred places, sanctuaries, holy books, objects of worship, symbols, 
rituals, ceremonies, sacred music, incense, etc., people are brought into a 
state of suggestibility, that is, into a peculiar state of mind which is 
favorable to suggestion. It is equally true that the other mass ideologies 
make use of the same mechanism of suggestion. In order to gain and keep 
citizens‟ support, the state employs a whole panoply of political means  ‒ 
dedicated buildings, historical sites, special clothes, symbols, rituals, 
patriotic music etc. ‒ that is actually a pastiche of the religious “tool kit” 
for creating a state of suggestibility. The same is true for many secular 
vested interests that insidiously use mass media for suggesting new ideas, 
values or habits, many of them being in contrast with the old religious 
traditions. The proponents of particular systems of beliefs ‒ whether they 
are religious or secular ‒ know very well that it is not easy to sustain true 
assent to them continuously and at full intensity. When faith weakened 
and declined, they fall back on the strong persuasion exerted by “the 
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reality of the objects of faith” (Barker 1901, 332). This kind of “external” 
influence involves the mechanism of suggestion. 
Belief is a continuing mental state (Swinburne 2001, 38) that sets 
implicit or anticipatory responses for specific occasions (Perry 1921, 140; 
157). Everyone possesses at any one time a web of various beliefs, but 
they are aware only of some of them. More exactly, a person is aware of a 
certain belief when it impinges on her consciousness, and this happens 
when a particular occasion elicits a specific response or when the person 
deliberately looks up the belief in her network of beliefs by asking herself 
what she thinks about a particular issue (cf. Swinburne 2001, 38). For 
example, two people who realize they stay in an unhappy marriage 
acknowledge some of their (already existing) beliefs by searching for a 
good reason to support their choice to stay together. It is possible for them 
to be aware of a strong religious belief in the indissolubility of marriage 
or the conviction that they have too many shared financial interests.  
Believers have a privileged (but not infallible) access to their 
beliefs (Mellor 1997-1998, 87). Generally speaking, “[a] belief is tested 
by trying the response on the occasion, or by trying it conjointly with 
other responses whose truth is assumed, or by comparing it with the 
responses of others” (Perry 1921, 157). By this assertion, Ralph Barton 
Perry suggests that people can infer the underlying reasons or beliefs of 
someone‟s acts or conduct only through trial and error. They always run 
the risk of going wrong, inasmuch as “[a] single action could display 
diverse beliefs, depending on the agent‟s wants” (Mellor 1997-1998, 89).  
Let us return to the above-mentioned example. We know that two 
persons stay together in an unhappy marriage because they assent to one 
or more of the following propositions: (a) what God has joined together, 
man cannot separate; (b) there is a social stigma attached to divorce; (c) 
divorced people have too much money to loose; (d) divorce has a 
devastating impact on the children; (e) after divorce, it would be very 
difficult to manage contact with children; (f) after a certain age, divorced 
people will not meet anyone else etc. However, we cannot be sure to 
which propositional content a particular couple staying together in an 
unhappy marriage assents. Interestingly enough, it is not certain which 
beliefs determine the decision to stay together even if the couple would 
give us an explicit answer such as “We stay together because we believe 
that what God has joined together, man cannot separate.” It is very 
possible that these people are lying or are deluding themselves. On the 
other hand, although both the couple and other people can determine the 
underlying beliefs of a certain response on a specific occasion only 
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through trial and error, the couple is in the best position to determine their 
true beliefs. Besides pondering the observable expressions of those beliefs 
(like all the others), the couple can make use of introspection and might 
take a possible emotional backup into consideration. 
 
4. Dimensions and traits of (religious) beliefs 
 
Whether they belong to the political, economic, cultural, or 
religious sphere, beliefs can be characterized with regard to the following 
dimensions (James 1919, 2-4; Swinburne 2001, 34-37; Audi 2008, 89): 
 liveness 
 strength 
 entrenchment 
 centrality 
 intensity 
All human beings are believers, inasmuch as each of us give our 
assent to some propositional contents. Evidently, propositional contents 
are not equally believable for all people. The proposition that non-human 
entities ‒ such as animals, plants, and inanimate objects ‒ have spirits can 
be seen as an object of faith for some indigenous tribal peoples, but not 
for the civilized nations of Europe. In the words of William James, one 
can say that the above-mentioned proposition is a live hypothesis to tribal 
peoples but a completely dead one to European nations. This shows that 
deadness and liveness in a hypothesis or proposition are not intrinsic 
properties, but relational properties depending on the particularities of 
people to whom the propositions are proposed. Liveness in a 
propositional content correlates with the willingness to act, and the 
maximum of liveness is associated with the willingness to act irrevocably 
(James 1919, 2-3). In that last case we can talk about a full belief. 
The strength of beliefs depends on two factors: (a) the presence of 
doubts and (b) the resistance to those doubts. Contrary to common sense, 
a belief does not clash directly with evidence or other beliefs (more 
exactly, with its rival beliefs), but with the doubts that arouse from the 
awareness thereof. It is strong enough to be considered a living belief 
provided that the persons who hold it dispel the doubts they have on the 
basis of the available evidence. 
Let‟s suppose the following four situations:  
1) As a credulous person, A believes that the remains 
discovered embedded in an altar of the Monastery “Sveti Ivan Island” 
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(Bulgaria) belong to St John the Baptist and she never doubted that 
the relics are authentic; 
2) As a rational believer, A believes that the remains 
discovered embedded in an altar of the Monastery “Sveti Ivan Island” 
(Bulgaria) belong to St John the Baptist, because her only doubts 
about the authenticity of relics were dispelled after reading that 
“[s]cientists from the University of Copenhagen analyzed the DNA of 
the bones, finding they came from a single individual, probably a 
man, from a family in the modern-day Middle East, where John would 
have lived”13. 
3) As a rational unbeliever, A does not believe that the 
remains discovered embedded in an altar of the Monastery “Sveti Ivan 
Island” (Bulgaria) belong to St John the Baptist, although she read the 
article in “The Telegraph”, because ‒ for him ‒ DNA analysis does 
not prove that the remains belong to St John the Baptist, but only to a 
man who lived in the early first century AD. She still has unsettled 
doubts about the authenticity of relics; 
4) As a haughty skeptic, A scoffs at the idea that the remains 
from the Monastery “Sveti Ivan Island” (Bulgaria) belong to St John 
the Baptist. She never entertained that possibility. 
The strength of belief is noticeable in the situations 2) and 3), 
where a person believes a propositional content, or the opposite, by 
assessing the evidence that ‒ in principle ‒ could nourish or dispel the 
corresponding doubts. The more numerous and serious are the doubts 
dispelled, the stronger the complementary beliefs are. The situations 1) 
and 4) present the manifestation of the weakest beliefs (that are also dead 
beliefs). Untried by (reasonable) doubts, beliefs held by the credulous and 
skeptical persons have no boundaries and consequently no substance. 
Ultimately, they are not actual beliefs. 
The third dimension of belief ‒ entrenchment ‒ “is a matter of 
how „rooted‟ the belief is, where rootedness is understood in terms of how 
much is required to eliminate it” (Audi 2008, 89). In general, entrenched 
beliefs are formed in childhood, or they are cultivated over a long period 
of time. During their long period of evolution, deep-rooted beliefs clash 
directly with many doubts and indirectly with many pieces of evidence 
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 “Scientists find new evidence supporting John the Baptist bones theory,” The Telegraph, June 
15, 2012. Accessed May 12, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9333052/ 
Scientists-find-new-evidence-supporting-John-the-Baptist-bones-theory.html. 
 
Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 160 
and rival beliefs. Figuratively speaking, they had to fight for survival and 
won. Emerged as adaptative strategies, entrenched beliefs underlie many 
complex webs of beliefs and connect intimately with personality traits, 
fundamental needs and goals, affective states, interests etc. Therefore, it is 
very difficult to uproot a deep-rooted belief, whether at the individual or 
societal level. On the other hand, if this happens, we have to cope with 
unpredictable dramatic changes in the life of both individuals and society. 
Every time an entrenched belief is eliminated, a Pandora's Box opens up. 
For example, it is a matter a fact that for hundreds of years the religious 
belief in the indissolubility of marriage was firmly rooted in the minds of 
European people, but, over the last few decades, it has faded away. Who 
could say how many other economic, social, political, cultural, 
psychological, environmental, etc. beliefs have faded away too, and who 
could envisage the medium- and long-term effects of that process? 
Perhaps the famous saying of Lucius Cary 2
nd
 Viscount Falkland ‒ 
“Where it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change” ‒ 
expresses a needed prudential norm for all people who fight against 
traditional, deep-rooted beliefs. Humans cannot live by superficial beliefs 
only. They need long-time cultivated, entrenched beliefs. 
The dimension of centrality correlates with the influence of belief 
over the whole of a person‟s psychology, especially on that person‟s 
conduct (Audi 2008, 89). A belief playing a central role in someone‟s life 
moulds to a large extent one‟s knowledge, opinions, emotions, mood, 
memories, attitudes, values, volition, behaviors, etc. For example, if person 
A strongly believes that the proactive use of force in someone‟s own sphere 
is always unjustifiable, and this belief plays a central role in her life, it is 
possible for us to notice the following clues of the belief
14: A doesn‟t lie, 
cheat, or steal; A doesn‟t hurt anyone deliberately; A explicitly disapproves 
abortion, euthanasia, redistributive policies, compulsory taxation, 
superfluous governmental expenditure, union of church and state, 
compulsory religious or sexual education, and government-enforced 
discrimination or integration; A believes that no one should be punished for 
denying a scientific or historical truth; A controls her anger; A is a gentle, 
caring person; A strives for autonomy; A steadily increases her capacity for 
self-control. The above-mentioned attractors emerge from the same 
principle and consistently reveal a particular type of personality ‒ the 
peaceful person. 
                                                 
14
 We can identify the signs of a central belief only in a tentative manner, i.e., through 
trial and error. Hence, the list of the manifestations of faith in the non-aggression 
principle is both incomplete and amendable. 
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In general, central beliefs are also strong and entrenched, but this 
is not always the case. Some people firmly hold certain strong beliefs, and 
these beliefs influence them considerably, but only from time to time and 
in connection with a very limited part of their lives. Other persons 
entertain some central beliefs, but these beliefs are nor strong enough to 
elicit ‒ publicly ‒ certain specific responses in certain particular 
circumstances. For example, there are non-practicing Christians who 
regularly visit certain places of pilgrimage believing that in this way they 
will be safe from diseases and afflictions. The particular, quasi-magical 
belief in the (practical) benefits of pilgrimage plays a peripheral role in 
the pilgrims‟ life. On the other hand, there have been people having a 
consistent, unified, but weak personality that restrained the affective, 
cognitive, or behavioral manifestations of their political or religious 
beliefs in times of persecution. Perhaps many so-called “renegades” hid 
their central beliefs in privacy or relegated them to the innermost part of 
their soul because they lacked the required psychic energy to face the 
persecutions. It is the case of the Moriscos, the Maranos, the crypto-
Christians, the crypto-communists, and other “cryptos”.  
Finally, “intensity is roughly a matter of the felt conviction ‒ the 
sense of truth ‒ that accompanies a belief [when it impinges on our 
consciousness]” (Audi 2008, 89). As rightly remarked by Pamela 
Hieronymi, “[b]elief is answerable to the truth in that, by nature, its 
justification rests on meeting standards of consistency and evidential 
support that have to do with the truth” (cf. French & Wettstein 2009, 38). 
In order to believe in something, people must feel a real need of true 
knowledge and must be convinced that the propositional content they assent 
to “corresponds to the truth of things”, by immediate evidence, by mediate 
proof, or by the testimonies of some reliable witnesses (cf. Livi 2005, 35).  
The intensity of belief correlates directly with the sentiment of 
being close to the truth and anchored in the objective reality. Nobody can 
hold an intense belief in a Pickwickian sense. If a person considers a 
proposition only in a merely hypothetical sense and accepts it just on the 
basis of a perceived general consensus, she actually holds a shallow or 
flat belief that cannot motivate action. When European Christians felt that 
their religious beliefs corresponded to the truth of things, they built great 
cathedrals and preached the Gospel to all nations
15
. Nowadays many 
                                                 
15
 Unfortunately, it is also true that they sometimes ruthlessly persecuted the dissenters. 
However, there is no causal connection between the intensity of (religious) beliefs and 
the tendency to persecute dissenters. 
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European Christians are no longer interested in the truth of their religious 
beliefs. Therefore, they have lost any missionary zeal. 
Faith in a supernatural order of the universe governed by a 
transcendent absolute being generates religious beliefs through a very 
complex process that involves – besides presumed supernatural revelations 
– psychological responses to stress, alienation, anxiety or despair, the 
effects of suggestion techniques, the social influence of some coercive or 
persuasive institutions (such as state, church, school or family) etc. 
Religious beliefs manifest the main characteristics of any religious 
experience. Following the excellent contribution of George Moyser 
(1991) on politics and religion in the modern world, we take into 
consideration only three of them, namely transcendence, sacredness, and 
ultimacy. Religious beliefs give people the sense of transcendence, 
inasmuch as the believers enter a supernatural reality, encounter powers 
that are much greater than their own, and give the religious order 
precedence over the social order of everyday life (Moyser 1991, 9). 
Sacredness implies a system of interdictions that protect and isolate 
sacred things from profane ones. As rightly remarked by Emile 
Durkheim, “[r]eligious beliefs are the representations which express the 
nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with 
each other or with profane things” (cf. Moyser 1991, 9). Finally, religious 
beliefs and religion in general “relate man to the ultimate conditions of his 
existence” (Moyser 1991, 9). Because of their ultimate meanings (which 
include values such as goodness, truth, justice, beauty, utility, etc.), 
religious beliefs orient the lives of believers to a symbolic vision of reality 
that transcends mundane facts. 
  
5. How secularized should the public  
sphere be in a liberal democracy? 
 
Having the above-mentioned characteristics, religious beliefs tend 
to be livelier, stronger, more entrenched, closer to the core of the 
believers‟ personalities and more intense than other types of beliefs. 
Religious beliefs are genuinely subjective experiences, but (due to their 
sense of truth) have the propensity to manifest themselves outside the 
believers‟ minds, especially in the public sphere. 
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Roughly speaking
16
, the public sphere is the discursive 
environment in which the individuals that constitute a society ‒ especially 
its political body ‒ formulate, discuss and debate general issues in order 
to prepare the way for collective actions. The public sphere does not exist 
as a natural state of affairs, but it emerges wherever people recognize 
their countrymen the following four rights: (a) the right to be present or to 
participate, (b) the right to know what is going on, (c) the right to judge 
actions by means of inter-subjective criteria and (d) the right to impose 
the observance of certain rules of conduct. By respecting these rights, 
people generate a public sphere that ‒ by sharp contrast to the private 
sphere ‒ has the following essential characteristics: (a‟) openness, (b‟) 
transparency, (c‟) external evaluation, and (d‟) external control.  
For Frank Cunningham, the public sphere is “a unique world, free of 
rivalry and competition, characterized by consensus and cooperation, where 
everyone can value their potential, develop their personality and live a 
virtuous life” (Cunningham 2002, 7). Reality categorically refutes this 
normative definition. The public sphere seems to be a rather unique world, 
characterized by openness, transparency, external evaluation and external 
control, where people pursue their private interests in competition with their 
fellow citizens
17
, on the basis of a consensus regarding the rules of fair 
conduct. It must be emphasized that the consensus on the “rules of the game” 
entails the public expression of axiological judgments. Axiological 
indifference is very appropriate in the private sphere, but it is pernicious in 
the public sphere, because it infringes upon critical thinking, the free 
exchange of information and the freedom of debates. 
As I mentioned in the first part of this article, (discursive) liberal 
democracy does not hinge on some transcendent fundamentals, but on a 
self-founding ideological framework. This frame of reference emerges 
progressively (but not linearly) by means of free discussions, arguments 
and debates within the public sphere. People who discuss, argue and 
debate plead their causes or points of view using reasons ‒ in other 
words, “real or supposed circumstance because of which an agent with 
purposes acts or refrains” (Charlton 2006, 52) ‒ as main instruments of 
                                                 
16
 The distinction between the public and the private sphere is discussed in more detail in 
the article Mass Media and European Cultural Citizenship (Farte 2009, 24-27). In this 
context, I present a simplified version of the topic. 
17 The pluralism of private interests does not imply the pluralism of public spheres. On 
the societal level, we cannot speak of a pluralism of public spheres – such as the 
black/Latino public sphere, the LGBT public sphere, the women‟s public sphere etc. – 
but of a plurality of interests represented in the public sphere. 
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persuasion. Inasmuch as the ideological framework of liberal democracy 
is a self-founding one, we must discuss with a critical eye all (legal or 
moral) restrictions imposed on the information flow, especially on the 
process of expressing publicly people‟s reasons for action. In what 
follows, we will weigh up some secular constraints that some important 
philosophers and social scientist have proposed to restrain the 
manifestation of the religious belief in the public sphere. 
At first, we refer to several restrictive constraints proposed by one 
of the most important secular voices, namely Richard Rorty. To better 
understand Rorty‟s remarks about religion, religious institutions, religious 
beliefs and religious reason, it is important to take into consideration his 
philosophical stance and political project. As an anti-representationalist, 
Rorty has stated that “[our] language cannot reflect, represent, or mirror 
the world as it actually exists” (cf. Bradizza 2014, 204) and denied any 
“metaphysical” or “redemptive” truths, including God‟s existence 
(Bradizza 2014, 204). As a “friendly atheist,”18 he conceded that 
“[r]eligious belief (...) is not irrational, or intrinsically wrong-headed” 
(Rorty 2003, 142). Rorty‟s political project is the attainment of a liberal 
(and egalitarian) society consisting of radically autonomous persons who 
think “that cruelty is the worst thing we do” (cf. Bradizza 2014, 204-209). 
This society “would be one in which political action conducted in the 
name of religious belief is treated as a ladder up which our ancestors 
climbed, but one that now should be thrown away” (Rorty 2003, 142). 
Referring to the so-called “Jeffersonian compromise” (that the 
Enlightenment reached with the religious in the USA), Rorty reminds us 
that this settlement consists in privatizing religion, more precisely, in 
“keeping it out of the public square and making it seem bad taste to bring 
religion into discussions of public policy” (Rorty 1999, 169). The 
Jeffersonian compromise defines the separationist position, i.e. the view 
that “politics must be constitutionally separated from religious conviction”, 
that “an individual‟s religious convictions are expected to remain private 
and divorced from his or her political decision-making, which [is] publicly 
grounded in reason” or that “laws should be advocated for and acted upon 
for secular reasons” (cf. Perlin 2011, 337). 
In congruence with his separationist stance, Rorty manifests an explicit 
anti-clericalism that advocates the eradication of “ecclesiastical organizations”, 
that is, the “organizations that accredit pastors and claim to offer authoritative 
                                                 
18
 The term was coined by atheist philosopher William Rowe for denoting those 
“nontheists who reject belief in God but nevertheless maintain that belief in God is 
rational” (cf. Beckwith 2014, 195). 
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guidance to believers” (Rorty 2003, 141). In Rorty‟s imagined secularist 
utopia, religion would be pruned back to the parish level
19
 (Rorty 2003, 142).  
For supporting his anti-clerical position, Rorty advances the 
following arguments: (a) “ecclesiastical organizations typically maintain 
their existence by deliberately creating ill-will toward people who belong 
to other such organizations, and toward people whose behavior they 
presume to call immoral” (Rorty 2003, 142); (b) “[h]istory suggests to us 
that such organizations will always, on balance, do more harm than good” 
(Rorty 2003, 142); (c) during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
“[t]he Protestant and Catholic churches of Western Europe did keep up a 
steady barrage of contempt, combined with support for politicians running 
on anti-Semitic platforms, and with silence concerning the sadistic 
pogroms-cum-gang-rapes which provided weekend amusement for the 
devoutly religious peasants of Central and Eastern Europe (Rorty 2003, 
145); (d) “[n]owadays the problem within most of the countries in which 
Christianity is the majority religion is not the possibility of religious war, 
but the sort of every day peace time sadism that uses religion to excuse 
cruelty” (Rorty 2003, 145). 
Before discussing the above-mentioned reasons, it is useful to 
remind us that man is essentially an imperfect being, and he is often 
inclined to cruelty. Hence, it is impossible to have human organizations 
(implicitly ecclesiastical organizations) free of shortcomings and 
wickedness. However, the ecclesiastical organizations are not worse than 
others, but quite the contrary. If ecclesiastical organizations from Europe 
deliberately create ill-will toward people who belong to other such 
organizations
20
, what about political parties, states or media trusts? It is a 
matter of fact that political parties elicit hatred and other negative 
emotions towards the competing parties. Election campaigns always and 
everywhere involve a language of violence and degradation or even 
physical violence. It is also a fact that war ‒ the most grave form of 
violence ‒ is waged by the states (not churches), and the media incite 
jealously, hatred or contempt insidiously and on a daily basis. As 
inherently imperfect organizations, churches did both good and harm, but 
states and corporations, for instance, did the same. Who could calculate 
how much human misery and human well-being respectively were caused 
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 Rorty differentiates between the “congregations of religious believers ministered to by 
pastors” and “ecclesiastical organizations.”  The former would be consistent with a 
secular liberal society. 
20
 Nowadays it is difficult to find official statements and actions of Christian 
ecclesiastical organizations that deliberately create ill-will toward other people. 
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by the Christian church in comparison to the European states and 
corporations throughout history? The crimes of the French Revolution, 
the horrors of Nazism and Bolshevism, and the two world wars far 
outweigh the crimes and miseries caused by the Christian church. Perhaps 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Protestant and Catholic 
churches of Western Europe did not take and maintain a strong stance 
against anti-Semitism. However, there were always many clergymen who 
combated anti-Semitism, and in the last decades the European churches 
are virtually unanimous in condemning it. Finally, it is true that there is a 
sort of every day peace time sadism that bring about a climate of cruelty. 
At present, the entire social life of the European societies is infested with 
disrespect, teasing, contempt, sarcasm, mockery or scorn. However, there 
is no evidence that the European churches created such a climate.
21
 Under 
these conditions, it is reasonable to grant the ecclesiastical institutions the 
same degree of acceptance as in the case of political parties, states or 
media trusts. 
Rorty‟s secular constraints on the public reasons stem from the 
correlation of religious beliefs with so-called redemptive truth. 
Redemptive truth “would not consist in theories about how things interact 
causally, but instead would fulfill the need to fit everything (...) into a 
[natural, destined, and unique] context” (Rorty 2000, 2). It implies the 
“conviction that a set of beliefs which can be justified to all human beings 
will also fulfill all the needs of all human beings” (Rorty 2000, 10). 
Because of the sense of absolute truth, believers would tend to use 
prematurely their religious beliefs as conversation-stoppers, although 
“citizens of a democracy should try to put off invoking conversation-
stoppers as long as possible” (Rorty 2003 148). 
First of all it is worth mentioning that many people strongly 
believe that they live in a natural, destined and unique world and 
assiduously try to know how things interact causally in that world. True 
believers have a strong sense of reality and do not try to shape their life or 
the life of their fellow citizens on the basis of certain fictions treated as 
such. They do not postulate that other people must have the same beliefs 
as theirs, but they believe that there are certain objective laws and 
regularities in the social reality
22
 (as a part of the whole world) that all 
people should take into account when forming their own beliefs. It seems 
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 If the European churches practice a sort of every day peace time sadism, what about 
the media? Is not mockery à la Charlie Hebdo a form of “peace time sadism”? 
22
 Obviously, we come to know these laws and regularities only in a tentative manner, 
through trial and error. 
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likely that the holders of redemptive truth in the pejorative sense are the 
people who believe that there is no ultimate or objective reality that 
underlies human existence and yet strive to impose their ideological 
framework on the entire society (or world). 
Secondly, it is not just religious believers but all people that 
invoke ‒ implicitly or explicitly ‒ conversation-stoppers when they 
discuss, argue or debate certain social issues in the public sphere. If 
religious beliefs (with their underlying sense of metaphysical or 
redemptive truth) are used as conversation-stoppers, various feelings, 
desires and interests, as well as a myriad of economic, political, 
philosophical or aesthetic beliefs play the same role. For instance, it is 
highly probable that people would sooner use a “sense of vital interest” as 
a conversation-stopper rather than their Christian beliefs. 
Finally, it is not always a good idea to put off invoking 
conversation-stoppers as long as possible. At least the political debates 
having the aim of taking decisions of general public importance should be 
correlated with a clause of completion. That clause should specify the 
circumstances in which the deliberations have reached the goal so that the 
decision might be taken and the discussion on the subject can be (at least 
temporarily) closed (cf. Ţuţui 2010, 96). Besides the clause of 
completion, we could take into consideration certain clauses of 
interruption. When our fellow citizens manifest strong bias, exaggerated 
self-interest, invincible ignorance, uncontrollable emotions or inconsistent 
thinking, it is better to interrupt the conversation than continue it. 
A second class of secular constraints on the ideological framework 
of liberal democracy belongs to Robert Audi. By means of two secular 
principles ‒ the principle of secular rationale and the principle of secular 
motivation ‒ Audi normatively indicates the so-called adequate secular 
reason and adequate secular motivation that citizens should have when 
they advocate coercive laws or public policies. 
 
The principle of secular rationale: “[C]itizens in a free 
democracy have a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support 
any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless they have 
and are willing to offer adequate secular reason for this advocacy or 
support; for instance, for a vote” (Audi 2007, 328). 
 
The principle of secular motivation: “[O]ne should abstain 
from advocating any law or policy unless one is sufficiently motivated 
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by (normatively) adequate secular reason. It is a part of civic virtue 
only to be motivated by secular reasons” (cf. Trigg 2007, 40). 
 
Audi argued that observing his principles preserves liberty, 
facilitates good relations between different religious traditions and 
between religious and non-religious people, encourages reciprocity and 
autonomy, establishes conditions under which citizens can respect one 
another as free and dignified individuals, reduces suspicion, resentment 
and the risk of religious polarization, and encourages mutual trust. He 
also implies that violating them could lead to civil strife (cf. Weithman 
2002, 149-150). Presented ‒ without conclusive proof ‒ as the panacea for 
all problems in the discursive public sphere, Audi‟s principles have some 
contentious aspects. 
It is worth noting from the start that citizens can support and 
(more specifically) vote some restrictive laws and public policies on the 
basis of certain religious beliefs. As long as a person keeps her religious 
beliefs private ‒ as strict subjective experiences ‒ nobody else can prove 
that she voted a (coercive) law by virtue of them. Evidently, Audi knows 
and accepts this fact. Moreover, he accepts that citizens publicly support 
any non-coercive laws, whether the reasons for supporting them are 
secular or religious. Audi‟s requirement of secular (that is, non-religious) 
reasons should be fulfilled only in the public sphere and just with regard 
to the coercive laws, because it is supposed that “laws and policies which 
restrict liberty must be justified by „accessible‟ or (...) „intelligible‟ 
reasons” (cf. Weithman 2002, 148). 
Even if Audi seems to soften his stance on the public reasons, the 
principle of secular rationale is unfairly biased against religion. If the 
fundamental need for public reasons is to be accessible or intelligible, it 
would have been better to talk about the “principle of accessible/ 
intelligible rationale”, taking for granted that most religious reasons are 
not accessible. Thus the scope of this principle could encompass ‒ besides 
some religious reasons ‒ lots of heavily biased secular reasons, such as 
the rationale behind many projects of social engineering that are quite 
unintelligible for common voters. In Europe, people frequently 
demonstrate and riot against certain economic policies, not against 
religious institutions or practices. Perhaps the political establishment itself 
does not follow the principle of intelligible rationale, as long as so many 
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European citizens do not understand and accept the secular public reasons 
behind the economic policies
23
. 
The principle of secular rationale seems to create confusion 
between “to be accessible/ intelligible”24 and “to be acceptable”. In fact, 
people understand very well both religious and secular (or atheistic) 
reasons. Even if a religious reason is partially unfalsifiable, it could be 
understood by most people in the same way that they understand other 
partially unfalsifiable reasons from the economic, political, or cultural 
sphere. To be fair, some (intelligible) religious reasons often cause 
cognitive dissonance to the unbelievers, but the same phenomenon occurs 
in the case of many secular reasons. What kind of reasons would remain 
in the public sphere if they had to be both accessible and 
(psychologically) acceptable for the majority of people? 
The condition to be sufficiently motivated by (normatively) 
adequate secular reason is excessive and unrealistic. First of all, it is 
difficult for a neutral observer to assign a certain motivation to a certain 
person. Someone could give an ex post facto reason for his action, but that 
reason does not coincide with one‟s genuine motivation. Hence, the 
principle of secular motivation cannot be legally enforced; it could be 
merely a moral imperative. Even as a moral imperative, the principle of 
secular motivation is hard to follow. We mentioned previously in this 
article that a believer does not hold a single belief but a web of beliefs. 
Religion tends to permeate the whole personality of the believer; 
therefore, it is practically impossible to isolate a secular enough belief, 
reason or motivation. It would be a bit cynical to ask religious persons to 
“purify” their motivation from all “malign” religious ingredients before 
entering the public sphere. Who should ascertain that they are motivated 
only by secular reasons? Their conscience, or their fellow citizens? 
Obviously, there is no acceptable answer. It is not fair that only religious 
persons should be confronted with such issues of conscience when acting 
in the public life of a society. It is also not fair that non-religious people 
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 How many voters from Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy or France do understand the 
secular rationale behind the financial policies of Eurozone? 
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 “Accessibility” is a fuzzy concept. It lacks clarity and is difficult to test or 
operationalize. Within a liberal democracy, the political body is a heterogeneous mass. It 
includes literate, intelligent, educated, learned, experienced and competent persons, on 
the one hand, and illiterate, uninformed, misinformed, uncultivated, uneducated, obtuse 
and incompetent people, on the other. If the accessibility requirement for public reason 
should be fulfilled with regard to the whole political body, one‟s speech (in the public 
sphere) could be just a collection of (secular) clichés and truisms. Obviously, no neutral 
observer would be able to confirm that the accessibility requirement was met. 
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should have to concede that the motivation of religious people is 
secularized enough to be allowed in the public sphere. If enforced, the 
principle of secular motivation would have a demotivating effect on 
religious citizens, because they could not afford the psychological cost of 
political participation. 
The softest stance on the scope of secularization belongs to Chris 
Eberle and Terence Cuneo who gave it the label “Doctrine of Religious 
Restraint”. In contrast with Rorty‟s position on secularization, the 
doctrine of religious restraint “does not require a thorough-going 
privatization of religious commitment” (Eberle & Cuneo 2015). It permits 
religious considerations to play a prominent role in the citizen‟s political 
life. “Citizens are permitted to vote for their favored coercive policies on 
exclusively religious grounds as well as to advocate publicly for those 
policies on religious grounds. What the [doctrine of religious restraint] 
does require of citizens is that they reasonably believe that they have 
some plausible secular rationale for each of the coercive laws that they 
support, which they are prepared to offer in political discussion” (Eberle 
and Cuneo 2015). 
Although the doctrine of religious restraint entails an important 
asymmetry between religious and secular reasons
25
 (cf. Flannagan 2015, 
3-5), it is highly reasonable for all the people that constitute a liberal 
democratic society. Within a complex adaptive system that is essentially 
imperfect, we cannot use the imperative of symmetry as a guiding 
principle. The living world does not have and cannot have a linear or 
symmetrical development. Moreover, if ecclesiastical organizations can 
ask their members to meet a certain standard of religious knowledge and 
moral conduct, the political body of a diverse society can also require 
their members to have a minimum amount of secular reasons with regard 
to some coercive laws. 
The doctrine of religious restraint is congruent with the attractors 
of discursive liberal democracy (majority rule, political equality, 
reasonable self-determination and an ideological framework built in a 
tentative manner) and provides the most convenient ideological 
framework both for secularist and educated religious people. A theocracy, 
that is, a social system or state controlled by religious leaders, is sheer 
hell for the secularist. It does not seem attractive to educated religious 
people who wish to live together with their fellow citizens in a diverse 
society (that functions as a complex adaptive system). A healthy dose of 
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 Secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but not religious reasons. 
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secularism allows religious and non-religious people to build a peaceful 
liberal democracy living together as civilized human beings. Too large a 
dose of secularism alienates religious people from the public life of 
society and radicalizes their idiosyncratic (religious) beliefs. If assumed, 
the doctrine of religious restraint creates a social climate that favors the 
manifestation of educated or enlightened religious beliefs in the public 
sphere. 
 
6. Educated religious beliefs as useful attractors  
in the liberal democratic public sphere 
 
So far I have argued that the pillars of discursive liberal democracy 
work as attractors of a complex adaptive system. In order to emerge as a 
liberal democracy, any society needs to undergo an adequate process of 
secularization. More exactly, it requires a healthy combination of 
constitutional, policy, institutional, agenda and ideological secularization. 
Unfortunately, increasingly more secularists take too strong a 
stance against the manifestation of religiosity in the public sphere. Under 
the banner of promoting a secular society, they suggest an unreasonable 
restraint of religious messages and practices in the public sphere. As the 
old saying goes, too much is never enough. People who advocate 
normative proposals relying on their wishful thinking instead of evidence 
and proof cannot reach a limit of their requirements. For the present, they 
try to exclude religious beliefs from the public sphere. Perhaps tomorrow 
they will propose the banning of some aesthetic, moral or philosophical 
reasons under the pretext that these reasons ‒ like religious reasons ‒ are 
discriminatory, divisive or non-accessible.  
Normally, the burden of proof with regard to the presence of 
religious reasons or beliefs in the public sphere should lie with the 
secularists who advocate their ban. By analyzing some secularist positions 
(especially the proposals of Richard Rorty and Robert Audi), we have 
claimed that the biased secularists do not provide sufficient warrants for 
their stance. On the one hand, the evils committed in the distant past in 
the name of (the Christian) religion do not sufficiently support the thesis 
that at present the manifestations of (the Christian) religion in the public 
sphere will bring about the same tragedies. Actually, most people tacitly 
admit that there is here no causal relationship inasmuch as anyone may 
advocate in the public sphere the ideas of the French Revolution and 
communist theses in spite of the crimes, abominations and atrocities that 
were committed in the recent past in their names. On the other hand, there 
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is no ground for believing that the absence of religion from the public 
sphere would generate a sort of secular heaven (like that imagined by 
Robert Audi). 
In order to advocate the presence of the religious reasons or 
beliefs in the public sphere, it is not enough to show that religious reasons 
are not worse than many secular reasons. Therefore, in what follows, we 
will argue that the manifestation of educated religious beliefs in the 
European public sphere is both legitimate and useful. 
First of all a strict secular public sphere does not provide a 
motivational climate for the members of the political body. A 
Pickwickian world suitable for inoffensive, dull and lethargic people can 
be easily constructed by means of (secular) public reason, which (a) “does 
not aim either at consent or truth”, (b) “requires that our moral or political 
principles be [only] justifiable to, or reasonably acceptable to, all those 
persons to whom the principles are meant to apply” and (c) cannot contain 
“controversial claims about religion, morality, or philosophy” (cf. Quong 
2013). Unfortunately for the utopian secularists, the real world is full of 
evil and pain. Life is not an easy game but a fight for survival in a hostile 
world. Human beings need energy, endurance, courage and a great 
capacity for strenuous effort in order to cope with life‟s evils. These 
requisites for living in the real world necessitate a sense of (metaphysical) 
truth, and religious beliefs provide it essentially. 
The sense of truth does not divide people. On the contrary, it 
provides durable bridges between them. If we start from the assumption 
that there is no objective truth, we should accept that everything can be 
negotiated, changed or eliminated. Under these conditions, no survival 
strategy can emerge. To be fair, religious people have the same sense of 
truth, but they could have different representations of truth. Of course, 
every true believer is convinced that he/she is right and those who have 
other representations of truth are wrong. However, under normal 
circumstances, he/she does not try to eliminate the dissenters but to 
persuade or convert them. 
Religious beliefs provide citizens with another important requisite 
for acting in public life, namely the will-power. As Henry Hazlitt 
remarked, man is a bundle of conflicting desires (Hazlitt 1922). In order 
to live a life worthy of a human being (as members of a peaceful, 
civilized society), people need to keep under control those conflicting 
desires that urge immediate gratification. It is not recommendable to 
control our desires by stifling them. Desires constitute the engine of our 
life; without them, nobody can act. The best way to control our desires 
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consists of putting them under the umbrella of a second-order desire, 
namely the will. The will may be defined as “our desire to be a certain 
kind of character” (Hazlitt 1922). The will is a desire for remote 
gratification, which “persists and predominates for a comparatively long 
period” (Hazlitt 1922). Like any other desire the will has its price. More 
precisely, one can follow one‟s will only if ready to sacrifice some of 
one‟s immediate desires. Obviously, individuals sacrifice their immediate 
desires provided that they dedicate themselves to an ideal high enough 
that is seen as their own (Hazlitt 1922). 
The Christian religion provides people with a high ideal, and 
throughout history it has shaped admirable characters
26
. During the entire 
Christian era, people of all social classes epitomized the Christian 
character enriching their mind and elevating their soul. They illustrated a 
main idea of Henry Hazlitt, namely that the will must be permanently 
“vivid and powerful enough to be acted upon in preference to any other 
fleeting or recurrent desire that may beckon him” (Hazlitt 1922).  
Perhaps the Christian character is not attractive enough at present, 
and many people living in a liberal democracy prefer to follow other 
ideals. Nevertheless, the manifestation of Christian character and 
Christian beliefs in the public sphere would be beneficial because it can 
attract the attention on the way of cultivating one‟s own will and gaining 
the necessary will-power. It is a pure illusion that people can build and 
cultivate a vivid and powerful will on a bundle of tepid public reasons in a 
Pickwickian world. In order to shape characters by means of second-order 
desires, the viable alternatives to the Christian system of beliefs should 
have similar characteristics. 
So far I have argued that all religious beliefs provide believers 
with a sense of metaphysical truth and second-order desires by means of 
which they follow certain ideals and shape their character. However, it is 
a matter of fact that man is an imperfect being and has a propensity to do 
evil. As human products, religious beliefs involve errors that cause harm 
to both believers and the others. In the name of religion, many people 
practiced extreme mortifications, committed plunder, rapes and crimes, 
aroused civil strife and waged devastating wars. Therefore, religious 
beliefs continuously need to be cultivated or educated. Otherwise, they 
cannot be allowed in the public sphere of a liberal democracy. 
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 There are thousands of examples at hand. In this context, I arbitrarily mention only 
Mother Teresa, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Charles I of Austria, Marie Adélaïde Clotilde 
Xavière de France, Blaise Pascal, André-Marie Ampère, Vincent de Paul, Hildegard von 
Bingen, and Benoît Labre. 
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It is important to note from the start that to educate a religious 
belief does not mean to adjust it at anybody‟s request. To be fair, all 
believers should follow the principle of peaceable conduct
27
, but they 
are not morally obliged to spare all sensitivities. In fact, to educate a 
belief means to confront it with the real world and the imperatives of a 
civilized life. 
As mentioned above, many pieces of one‟s web of religious 
beliefs have only a narrow propositional content because they are 
determined predominantly by the believer‟s intrinsic properties. In the 
context of liberal democracy, it is recommendable for believers to widen 
prudently the content of their religious beliefs in order to reduce their 
idiosyncratic characteristics. A believer who behaves erratically cannot 
convert anybody to his or her system of (uneducated) beliefs. 
Even if the concept of insufficient evidence is a fuzzy one, it is 
useful to take into consideration ‒ when we evaluate our assent to some 
religious beliefs ‒ Clifford‟s ethical imperative: “[it is] wrong to believe 
on insufficient evidence, or to nourish belief by suppressing doubts and 
avoiding investigation” (Clifford 1879, 182-183). Evidently, we cannot 
acquire any belief in a fully controllable manner, and we cannot erase a 
certain belief from our mind at will. Moreover, we cannot voluntarily 
doubt our beliefs. However, we have the moral obligation to take into 
consideration our involuntary doubts and all the evidence that support 
them. For example, if I have some doubts about the authenticity of certain 
relics, I have the moral obligation to ask some plausible evidence before 
worshiping them. Such evidence can make the authenticity of the relics 
more plausible or, on the contrary, the evidence can infirm it. More 
specifically, if it is said that the relics from a monastery belong to St 
Andrew the Apostle, the evidence can show that they are connected to a 
Jewish man who lived in the first century A.D. The evidence alone does 
not prove that the relics belong to St Andrew the Apostle, but the 
corresponding educated belief becomes more plausible. On the contrary, 
if the analysis of the relics shows that they belong to a woman or a man 
from the 16
th
 century, it would be immoral to nourish the false belief that 
the remains belong to St Andrew the Apostle. 
Although they are partially unfalsifiable, religious beliefs can be 
tested at least with regard to the character they are supposed to build. 
Thus, it is said that Christian character yields a harvest of love, joy, peace, 
patience, kindness, generosity, forbearance, gentleness, faith, courtesy, 
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 I presented some aspects of this important principle in the article “The Principle of 
Peaceble Conduct as a Discrimination Tool in Social Life” (Farte, 2015). 
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temperateness and purity. Throughout history, a myriad of Christians 
have shown these character traits. Hence, it is reasonable to nourish the 
conscious belief that the Christian faith supports civilized life by bringing 
about love, joy, peace, patience, etc. If certain so-called Christians do not 
live up to the assumed ideal and do not show the corresponding character 
traits, we can remind them the implications of their commitment. 
Finally, as mentioned above, we can educate our (religious) 
beliefs by knowing and consciously using the mechanism of suggestion. 
First of all people should focus their mind on the desire to have a certain 
kind of character. They should know what kind of feelings, thoughts and 
behaviors are correlated with these character traits. Thus, they can learn in 
a tentative manner (that is, through trial and error) how to protect 
themselves from those suggestions that induce unwanted and destructive 
beliefs and how to expose themselves to the reality of the objects of faith 
in order to improve their web of beliefs. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We took it for granted that discursive liberal democracy emerged 
in Europe as the best of all possible forms of government and have argued 
that the public sphere of liberal democracies needs an adequate dose of 
secularization. Unfortunately, many promoters of ideological 
secularization take too strong a stance against the manifestation of 
religiosity in the public sphere. They claim that people may discuss, 
debate or adopt (coercive) laws and regularities only by means of secular 
public reason and secular motivation. We provided some strong 
arguments for the thesis that these secular restraints on the ideological 
framework are biased, unfair, counterproductive and unreasonable. 
Religious reasons are no less accessible and intelligible than many other 
aesthetic, moral or philosophical secular reasons. Hence, it is not fair to 
ban only religious beliefs with regard to the so-called principle of 
accessibility. The ban of religious beliefs in the public sphere cannot be 
enforced and brings about perverse effects. If banned from acting openly 
on religious grounds, religious people can still participate in the political 
life on the basis of their idiosyncratic beliefs. Excluded from the public 
sphere, these beliefs cannot be checked and educated so that people who 
(privately) assent to them can manifest disruptive behaviors. The 
exaggerated secular restrictions are unreasonable because the strict 
secular public sphere they create appears to be a Pickwickian world 
suitable for inoffensive, dull and lethargic people. 
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As Robert Spaeman insightfully remarked, “[t]he personality of 
man stands and falls with his capacity to grasp truth” (Spaemann 2005, 
618). If it does not aim either at consent or truth, secular public reason 
cannot sustain a complex adaptive system like discursive liberal 
democracy. Liberal democracy needs citizens with a strong sense of truth 
and with sufficient will-power to follow both a personal ideal and a 
collective one. Religious beliefs provide people with just such a sense of 
truth and with the desire to have a certain kind of character. 
In the secularized public sphere of liberal democracy, people 
should manifest just educated religious beliefs that correspond to the real 
world and respect the principle of peaceable conduct. Educated religious 
beliefs have a wide enough propositional content, respect the moral 
imperative of William Clifford, are purged from all propositional 
components against which there is strong evidence and are consciously 
cultivated by the mechanism of suggestion. 
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